Nezávislost centrální banky a její význam pro stabilní hospodářský růst

In the literature, the consensus about the importance of the independence of the central banks towards stable economic growth has been proven (e.g. Barro and Gordon 1983). The empirical papers studying this problem follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) central bank independence index which does not include some important factors such as rule of law in the given country and defines the components of independence too generally. In this project, we aim to build an alternative index that will measure the central bank independence in more detail which will account for the rule of law and other relevant aspects that indirectly affect the true independence of the central bank. Obtaining the index, we will study whether the independence of the central bank has a positive effect on maintaining the given central bank's primary target. Furthermore, in this research, we aim to test whether our results differ from the previous findings in the empirical literature on the central bank independence and its effect on stable prices. Based on the obtained results, an optimal legislature of the central bank's independence shall be suggested.